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Abstract –We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present.
Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The
behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by indifference w.r.t. the game at all: their dynamics is
designed to account for risk-aversion as an innovative behavioral gambit. From this point of view,
the choice of this solitary strategy is enhanced when innovation starts, while is depressed when it
becomes the majority option. This implies that the payoff matrix of the game becomes dependent
on the global awareness of the agents measured by the relevance of the population of the indifferent
players. The resulting dynamics is non-trivial with different kinds of phase transition depending
on a few model parameters. The phase diagram is studied on regular as well as complex networks.
Introduction. – Risk and uncertainty are important
elements of human behavior, in particular when dealing
with interactions of international teams and global coun-
terparts. Here, by risk we just mean the intrinsic un-
certainty in a multi-strategy individual interaction/game
characterized by a pay-off depending non-trivially on the
mutual strategic choices. The level of risk or, generally
speaking, uncertainty that may be tolerable is not con-
stant over different cultures, see for instance [1, 2]. It
appears that risk aversion attitude is correlated with a
low amount of tolerance for vague or ambiguous be-
haviours. In such a case, structured sets of rules are pre-
ferred over more undetermined situations. This implies
a sort of cultural payoff component associated with play-
ing risk-averse strategies. Besides, cultural conformity is
a key factor in the evolution of complex culture in hu-
mans [3–5] as well as in animals [6]. On the other hand,
there is tension with the drive to innovate. Innovation
is an important ingredient to promote longstanding high
levels of welfare, as it happens in real markets [7–9]. De-
viation from conformity is an important evolutive mech-
anism, the so-called behavioral gambit, see for instance
[10]. In this paper we propose a simple model describing
how innovation is triggered when a population compo-
nent is risk-averse in presence of many individuals ac-
cepting playing some risky competition requiring coop-
eration. We shall assume a tendency to play risk averse
strategy with enhanced payoff for the above mentioned
cultural reasons. On the other hand, we shall also assume
that an increased sense of safety due to a large number of
risk-averse players will feedback the strategy choice and
reduce the extra payoff allowing for more risk-loving atti-
tudes. In the context of epidemics disease critical spread-
ing [11], it is also natural to assume that the effective in-
fection probability is affected by the perception of the risk
of being infected. This has been assumed to be related
to the fraction of infected neighbors in the recent mod-
els discussed in [12–14]. The precise mechanisms for this
to happen are an important issue, like aggregation effects
[15] or the role of the endorsers [16]. Here, we shall ex-
plore the dynamical balance between risk-aversion and
the opposite behaviour induced by global awareness of
the fact that such attitude is the majority option: a natu-
ral application of the present model deals with the phe-
nomenon of nonconformism, a tendency ranging from so-
cial and political settings to economic or financial con-
texts. Nonconformist individuals refuse to take part in
the game, and their behavior does not depend on the in-
teractions with other competitors. They also tend to ar-
range in closed subcommunities sharing the same behav-
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ior (or opinion). A distinctive feature of the phenomenon
is that the nonconformist option is discouraged if this be-
havior becomes a mainstream mindset.
We shall describe this competition by means of evolu-
tionary game theory [17–20]. This is a theoretical frame-
work where emergence of collective behaviour may be
observed, especially when played on structured popula-
tions [21, 22]. We shall adopt the Snowdrift Game as our
background model of competition [23]. In the Snowdrift
Game [24] cooperating players can coexist with defec-
tor ones even in well-mixed systems. The spatial struc-
ture is important and may even hinder the evolution
of cooperation [25]. More recently, Santos and Pacheco
[26] discovered that cooperation generically emerges on
scale-free networks. In addition, Szabó et al. [27–29] pre-
sented a stochastic evolutionary rule aimed to capture the
bounded rationality feature in order to characterize real
system game dynamics.
We focus on the memory-based Snowdrift Game pro-
posed in [30]. In this model, the effects of the individu-
als memory is taken into account in the determination of
the evolution of strategies: players update their strategies
based on their past experience. This approach is based on
[31], where a so-called minority game [32,33] is considered
in which agents make decisions exclusively according to
the common information stored in their memories. It is
found that finite memories of agents have crucial effects
on the dynamics of the minority game [34, 35].
To take into account the risk-averse strategy option we
included solitary players [36, 37]. In the standard snow-
drift game with these loners, one has a solitary-strategy
describing people choosing not to participate in the com-
petition and would prefer to take a fixed albeit small pay-
off. Hauert et al. studied the effects of their presence
in a generalization of the prisoner dilemma game called
the public goods game [28, 38]. This basic model will be
modified in order to take into account two novel mecha-
nisms according to the previous discussion. The first is a
cultural payoff enhancements for those players choosing
to avoid the snowdrift game strategies. The second is a
damping effect of the risk-aversion tendency. It depends
on the global awareness of the system, i.e. on the fraction
of players preferring the risk-averse strategy, in the spirit
of [12].
The Modified Snowdrift Game. – In [39] the authors
resumed the SG model with the loners in the evolution-
ary setting, while memory in the system has been consid-
ered for the pure SG in [9]. The main results of these two
papers will be summarized in the Supplementary Mate-
rial.
Our modification of the Snowdrift game with S players is
based on the payoff matrix
P =
C D S( )C 1 1− r q
D 1+ r 0 q
S (1+ ξ) q (1+ ξ) q (1+ ξ) q
, (1)
where r is the cost-to-reward ratio, q a fixed constant and
at each round
ξ = 1− fS, (2)
fS being the fraction of players in the S-strategy. The
payoff for pair of strategies involving solitaries is stan-
dard for ξ = 0. Adopting the solitary strategy has an
additional payoff ξ q decreasing when the number of S-
players increases. The rules of this memory-based evolu-
tionary game are the following: let us consider a generic
graph; each player lies on a node of this graph such that
pairwise connected players challenge reciprocally match
by match and this happens for all the (connected) cou-
ples. The total payoff of any player is simply the linear
sum of the payoff collected in each single duel. Once a
round is terminated, all the players evaluate their perfor-
mances by playing a virtual match where they use the
anti-strategy w.r.t. the one they’ve just adopted in order
to calculate their potential reward with this revised set-
tings: if the latter is actually better then the employed
one (i.e., if the player obtained higher score with the anti-
strategy), it keeps the latter as the best strategy to be
used and it stores this information in its memory (whose
length is fixed to M bits1). Once a new game starts, the
probability of making a decision (i.e., choosing C, D or S)
depends on the relative ratio of the numbers of C, D and
S stored in the player’s memories, then, they all update
their memories simultaneously and, by iterating the out-
lines steps, the game’s dynamics takes place.
Note that the parameter ξ introduces a global feedback in
the score of the S players, which now depends not only
on the local interaction but also on the global state of the
community.
We introduce, as order parameters, the three fractions of
players
fC ≡ CN , fD ≡
D
N
, fS ≡ SN ,
(where N = C + D + S), and we will study them as func-
tions of r for fixed values of q = {0.1, . . . , 0.4} and vicev-
ersa 2.
Note further that a pure SG with memory-driven evolu-
tion has been considered in [9], both in regular lattices
and complex networks, where it has been shown that tak-
ing the memory Markovian and with finite length, the
evolution of the system always reaches an (almost) stable
state, characterized by a (roughly) constant frequency of
cooperators. In the regular lattice, cooperators and de-
fectors arrange in typical spatial patterns and fC has a
1We deepen this point in the Supplementary Material.
2Numerically, the curves are obtained averaging over 100 Monte
Carlo simulations for any value of r and q.
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step-shape as function of r, the number of step being dic-
tated by the number of neighbors. A variation of the SG
Fig. 1: Phase diagram of the model. The black lines mark the
transitions from the first phase without solitaries to the second
with the three strategies coexisting and from the second to the
(unstable) third one.
theme with the S-players has been instead analyzed in
[39], where the authors focused on completely connected
graphs and regular (with four neighbors) lattices. Their
main results are that, in a completely connected graph,
the coexistence of the three characters is impossible: C
and D players can exist only in the absence of solitary
category, or the latter take over the entire population. For
the regular graph, instead, the presence of the S-players
leads to an improvement of the collaborative attitude, co-
existence is possible, and in general the C-players can
survive in the full parameter space of the model.
Regular lattice R8. – In this section we discuss the
results for our extension in a regular lattice with 8 neigh-
bors. The phase diagram of the model can be divided in
three main regions in the (r, q) = [0, 1]× [0, 1] square, as
shown in the phase diagram presented in figure 1. In the
first and second phases the system evolves to a steady
state with coexisting C-D and C-D-S players respectively.
In the third phase, the players never reach a stable strat-
egy choice. In the first phase (highlighted in blue), for r
and q small enough, the system evolves toward a stable
final state without S-players. The final state is the same
as it would be for a community without the S-players at
all, and the step-like shapes of the fC,D fractions are ev-
ident from the plots of the densities vs r as reported in
figure 2. In the second phase (highlighted in green), the
system evolves almost everywhere (see below) to a stable
final configuration characterized by the coexistence of the
three kinds of players. However the total fraction of S in-
dividuals, as the size of their clusters, increase both with
q and r, as a glance at both figures 2, 3 may confirm.
Fig. 2: Fractions of cooperators fC, defectors fD and solitary
players fS as functions of the parameter r for q = 0.1, . . . 0.4.
Green dots denotes fC, red fD and gray fS. The shaded regions
in the plots correspond to the third phase of the system where
no stable spatial arrangement is reached. Gray vertical lines cor-
respond to the phase transitions in the SG without S-players.
Further analysis is presented in the Supplementary Material.
This phase is characterized by typical spatial configu-
rations, where S-players arrange forming clustered sub-
communities. We stress that this stable spatial arrange-
ment of the strategies is strikingly different from the re-
sults of [39]. Both the stability of the final state and
the regularity of the patterns are consequences of the
memory-based update for the strategies of the players.
Despite the phase diagram of the model of [39] is qual-
itatively similar to the present one, the probabilistic up-
date of their players forbids the stability of the choices
and consequently the formation of the patterns. The re-
arrangement in sub-communities by the S-players is in-
stead dictated by the nonlinear feedback of ξ in the pay-
off matrix, favouring the grouping of players that prefer
not to participate.
Looking at the various q = 0.1, 0.2, ... in figure 2, one can
clearly see that once the solitaries appear, their fraction
becomes quickly dominant increasing r: a higher payoff
for the defectors means a higher risk to be cheated for
the C-players, and progressively more and more individ-
uals find advantageous to avoid this risk, choosing for
the solitary behavior.
The fraction fS is an increasing function of both r and q
but in rather different ways: while the transitions of fS in
r are first-order (i.e. there is a genuine jump by the order
parameter at the critical values rc, see figure 2)3, the tran-
sition from zero to non-zero values for fS vs q resembles a
critical (second-order) scenario: the order parameter con-
tinuously raises from zero at qC, see figure 3 (further there
3We discuss in the Supplementary Material how to locate these crit-
ical rC values by a standard stability analysis.
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Fig. 3: Fractions of cooperators fC, defectors fD and solitary
players fS as functions of the parameter q for r = 0.1, . . . 0.4.
Green dots denotes fC, red fD and gray dots fS. The shaded
regions in the plots correspond to the third phase of the system
where no stable spatial arrangement is reached.
is a genuine divergence in the susceptibility -the variance
of the order parameters, suitably amplified by a volume
factor- for q → qC, as deepened in the Supplementary
Material). We aim to better characterize phase II (since
Fig. 4: Probability distributions (and relative snapshots) for
the size S of S-clusters (in gray), in a 100× 100 lattice for fixed
q = 0.3 and varying r around the percolation threshold for a
giant S-component.
understanding network’s dynamics in that phase is cru-
cial to see why there is a third, unstable, phase in the
phase diagram) by looking at the evolution of the size dis-
tribution of the S-clusters: in figure 4 we show the proba-
bility distributions for the size of S-clusters, in a 100× 100
lattice at fixed q = 0.3 and varying r around the percola-
tion threshold for a S-players’ giant component. These
loners appears in a relatively large number of small is-
lands progressively increasing their size and eroding the
regular pattern of C- and D-players, eventually merging.
As anticipated above, in this phase the system does not
always reach a perfectly stable final configuration: this is
because a (relatively small) fraction of players (typically
located at the borders of the S-clusters) can exhibit an os-
cillatory behavior. These local instabilities are closely re-
lated to an oscillating balance in the payoff matrix among
the possible gains, due to the nonlinear feedback of ξ: this
results in a perpetual indecisiveness for some players as
a structural property for models with global awareness.
The growth of the S-density leads eventually to another
transition4 toward the third phase, where the system is
intrinsically unstable: all the players are never able to
make a definitive choice for a strategy. Indeed, for large
enough q, the incentive not to participate to the SG would
make the S-strategy the preferred choice for all the in-
dividuals and the system would evolve toward a state
where the S-players completely dominate the system.
Nevertheless, a configuration with only S players is not
stable. With fS = 1 and ξ = 0 in the payoff matrix, all
the players would get exactly the same payoff for any
strategy they choose (resulting in a random update rule),
leading to a destabilization of the system configuration.
Finally, we note that, despite a spatial arrangement is im-
possible, yet the model is still characterized by some con-
stant (averaged in time) fractions for the strategies of the
players in this third phase, as can be clearly seen in the
gray regions of the plots in figures 2, 3, but the collabora-
tive attitude is highly inhibited.
Complex Networks. – The SG with S-players can
be extended as well on complex networks. In this sec-
tion, we consider the model on two typical examples of
complex networks, namely Watts-Strogatz (WS) [42] and
Barabàsi-Albert (BA) [41] graphs.
Watts-Strogatz Networks. In the Watts-Strogatz case,
we consider two realizations of the networks for differ-
ent rewiring probabilities (θ = 0.1 and θ = 0.5) in the
algorithmic construction of the topology. The global pic-
ture for the relationships among the characters resembles
the results obtained in the regular graph and the phase
space is qualitatively very similar. The evolution of the
fractions of C, D and S players is summarized in figure 5
as a function of the parameter r in the payoff matrix (for
fixed q values).
As in the regular case, low values of r lead to the ex-
tinction of solitary players. Increasing r, the S-density in
the final configuration is non-vanishing and takes over
quickly the majority of the nodes (again, when the frac-
tion of the these players approaches 1 the final config-
uration becomes unstable). Looking at the fractions for
θ = 0.1 and θ = 0.5, one can immediately see that the
results look extremely similar and qualitatively indepen-
dent on the rewiring probability.
4The nature of the transition is deepened in the Supplementary Ma-
terial.
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Fig. 5: Fractions of cooperators fC, defectors fD and solitary
players fS as functions of the parameter r, for a WS network
with θ = 0.1 (darker colors) and θ = 0.5 (lighter colors). Green
dots denote fC, red fD and gray fS. The shaded regions in the
plots correspond to the third phase of the system, where no sta-
ble spatial arrangement is reached.
One may note that, at least in the first phase (without S-
players in the final state), one can spot a reminiscence of
a steps-like pattern for the C- and D-densities: the WS
model is in fact realized starting from a regular graph
with a rewiring prescription governed by θ. This pro-
cedure preserves the mean degree, and the final degree
distribution falls exponentially (in the volume) for large
deviations from the mean value. At least for small θ val-
ues, this makes the system’s dynamics in the WS set-
ting rather close to that on a regular network with the
same mean degree for the nodes (essentially assuming
P(k) → δ(k− k¯)). Then, by noticing that the evolution of
the system remains qualitatively the same even for larger
θ values, one could say that the SG game (with or without
S-players) is rather insensitive to the small-world property
of a network (since the strategy choices are almost com-
pletely dictated by local interactions among individuals).
Increasing the rewiring probability, i.e. the randomiza-
tion of the final graph, has the only effect to slightly and
uniformly reduce the convenience of a collaborative be-
havior.
Barabàsi-Albert Networks. The preferential attachment
algorithm for the construction of the BA graphs results in
a (approximatively for finite size graphs) power law dis-
tribution of the nodes. In this case, the local structure of
the network is extremely heterogeneous. From the results
of the previous sections, one can thus expect that the SG
with S-players is characterized by a totally different evo-
lution in the BA setting. This expectation is confirmed
by [9], where the authors considered the pure SG with
memory in scale-free networks. Without the S-players,
the authors [9] found that the cooperative density has a
Fig. 6: Fractions of cooperators fC, defectors fD and solitary
players fS as functions of the parameter r for different choices
of q. Green dots denotes fC, red fD and gray fS. The shaded
regions in the plots correspond to the third phase of the system
where no stable spatial arrangement is reached.
strong, non-monotonous dependence on the parameter
r. In particular, fC presents peaks at specific values of r,
resulting in the non intuitive picture that a larger payoff
for a selfish behavior may lead to an enhancement of the
collaboration. As the S-players are included in the game,
the above results change drastically: figure 6 reports the
fractions of cooperators fC, defectors fD and solitaries fS
as functions of the parameter r, for different choices of
q in BA2 graphs (we denote with BA2 the Barabàsi Al-
bert networks constructed adding a node with two new
links at any step of the growing algorithm). Increasing r
for a given q, the S-players take again quickly the major-
ity of the nodes, but their presence has a strong destruc-
tive effect on the collaborative behavior of the other play-
ers: the fraction of the collaborators never grows with r
in presence of the S players. This is even more evident
looking at the relative fractions of the C and D behav-
iors only, excluding the S-nodes in the normalizations, i.e
f¯C,D =
nC,D
nC+nD
(reported in lighter colors in figure 6). The
presence of the S-players strongly inhibits the collabora-
tion, the relative fraction f¯C being constantly lower than
f¯D as the great majority of the players that do not opt for
the S-strategy are forced to be defectors. We can better
understand the evolution of the dynamics on these net-
works looking at the mean degree of the nodes occupied
by the various players, as shown in figure 7. For all the
values of q, the mean degree of the collaborating nodes
has a sharp peak when r grows enough such that the S-
players are close to take over the network (i.e. at the onset
of the transition to the unstable phase). These plots sug-
gest that, while the solitaries become progressively the
largest fraction increasing the payoff for the defection, the
collaborative behavior resists only in few nodes with a
p-5
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Fig. 7: Mean degree of the C, D and S nodes respectively. Green
dots denotes the mean degree of the nodes occupied by C play-
ers, red dots are used for D players and finally gray dots denote
S players. The plots show the mean degree as function of the
parameter r for different choices of q. The shaded regions in
the plots correspond to the third phase of the system where no
stable spatial arrangement is observed.
relatively large degree, where the minority of C-players
is segregated and surrounded. The role of high degree
nodes as bastions of least resistance for the cooperative
choice is rather unusual. On the other hand, the mean
degree of the S-players stays almost constant after their
appearance, suggesting that this strategy spreads among
the various players as r increases in a rather uniform way.
Conclusions. – By including also solitary players, in
this paper, we extended the Snowdrift Game with mem-
ory to account for a third behavior, whose decisional pro-
cess relies on global awareness (and not just local knowl-
edge) in a minority-game attitude: we studied numerically
the phase diagram of this model, namely the evolution
of the relative fractions of the three types of players ver-
sus the tunable parameters r (the standard cost-to-reward
ratio) and q (the solitary payoff). We found robust numer-
ical evidences that, starting by r = 0 and q = 0, along the
r-axes, the evolution of these fractions happens trough
discontinuous (first-order like) phase transitions, while
its growth along the q-axes is smooth and coupled to a
peak of their fluctuations, as typical in critical (second-
order like) phase transitions. Nevertheless, the model
has a third, intrinsically unstable, phase -driven by the
global awareness introduced in the payoff matrix- that is
reached for high values of (r, q) in a way quite similar to
percolation in random graphs.
Concerning the role of the solitary strategy, we found
that individuals choosing this behavior show a strong
predisposition to group together in clusters for rela-
tively high q, therefore mimicing the tendency of noncon-
formist people to join together in subcommunities with
the same mindset (e.g. Facebook pages, blogs, organiza-
tions etc.). However, increasing further the loners’ pay-
off q leads to the unstable phase, in which the gain in
the nonconformist behavior is so high that it quickly be-
comes the majority option, thus turning into a conven-
tional attitude. Then, all of the three strategies becomes
equally profitable, resulting in a downsizing of the non-
conformist front and making the evolution cyclic. As fu-
ture outlooks we aim to bypass the pairwise decision rule
enlarging the outlined scheme to include also mixed pop-
ulations [43].
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The snow-drift game with memory. – In order to
frame correctly our work, we use this first section of the
Supplementary Material to briefly resume the relevant re-
sults recently appeared in the Literature.
The standard snowdrift model may be described in terms
of the dilemma of two players blocked by a snowdrift.
Each player can choose a collaborative (C) behavior (and
help to shovel, sharing the effort) or a defective (D) at-
titude (in the hope to exploit the other player’s effort).
Collaboration leads to a gain, but has a cost. The cost is
shared if both player choose the C strategy, but is borne
by the collaborative player only if its partner choose to be
defective. While both players would maximize the per-
sonal gain choosing a defective attitude if the other player
is collaborative, they risk to gain nothing if both opt for
a defective strategy. The two player model can be com-
pletely characterized by the following payoff matrix for
the possible combinations of C-D choices.
PCD =
C D( )
C 1 1− r
D 1+ r 0
(3)
where the parameter 0 < r < 1 represents the cost-
to-reward ratio. The model can be easily extended to a
community, where any of the individual can choose the
collaborative or defective behavior when playing with a
number of other members. The total payoff of each player
is the sum over all its encounters. In an evolutionary set-
ting, the game is repeated over time, with the players up-
dating their strategies to maximize their gain. The update
of the strategy may involve a comparison with the gains
obtained by other players or be based on the experience
i.e. the memory of the player itself.
A pure SG with memory-driven evolution has been con-
sidered in [9], both in regular lattices and complex net-
works. Here we briefly summarize their results for the
regular lattice particularly relevant for our study. Taking
the memory length M ≥ 2 and finite, the evolution of
the system always reaches a (almost) stable state, char-
acterized by a (roughly) constant density of cooperators
fC. In the regular lattice cooperators and defectors ar-
range in typical spatial patterns and fC has a steps-shape
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as function of r, the number of steps being dictated by
the number of neighbors. This behavior of fC can be ex-
plained looking at the local stability of the possible ar-
rangements of the C and D strategies on the lattice. In-
deed, for the eight neighbor case, looking at a 3 × 3 lo-
cal square on the lattice, a central C individual with k
C-neighbors and 8 − k D-neighbors would get a score
SC(r) = k + (8− k)(1− r). Turning to a D behavior its
score would be SD(r) = k(1 + r). Comparing the two
score, the local stability imposes
SC(rc) = SD(rc), (4)
giving 8 solutions for rc = 1/8, 2/8, . . . , 1, which are the
critical values of r that mark the transitions (see figure
two in the main text). In each of these eight regions [0 <
r < 1/8], [1/8 < r < 2/8], . . . the final density of the
cooperators is constant in the absorbing state, resulting
in the steps shape of fC mentioned above.
Accounting for behavioral gambit of loyalists, a sum-
mary of results. – The presence of a third character has
been studied starting from [1, 2], in the so-called Public
Goods Game. The new strategy (to which we refer as
"solitary" (S) or "loner") accounts for individuals choos-
ing the risk-averse behavior. A variation for the SG game
including the S-players has been already analyzed in [5].
They refuse to partecipate to the SG, obtaining as a re-
ward a fixed income (independent of the cost-to-reward
ratio r). The associated payoff matrix is then
PCDS =
C D S( )C 1 1− r q
D 1+ r 0 q
S q q q
, (5)
where q is a fixed constant. In their work [5], the au-
thors focused on completely connected graphs and reg-
ular (with four neighbors) lattices.
In completely connected graphs, the coexistence of the
three characters is impossible: indeed, C- and D-players
can only exist in absence of S-individuals, otherwise the
latter take over the entire population. This result can be
understood by noticing that the total payoffs only depend
on the densities at the time under consideration, with
each type of player having the same payoff.
On the other hand, for regular graphs the presence of
solitary players leads to an improvement of the collab-
orative attitude, so coexistence is possible and generally
C-players survive in the square [0 < r < 1]× [0 < q < 1].
Moreover, exploring the full parameter space one finds
three possible phases: the first one exhibiting a uniform
C-player population, the second one with coexisting C-
and D-individuals, and finally the third phase with all of
the three characters present. In the regular lattice, the sur-
vival of cooperators is facilitated because of the S-players
(as they enhance their presence average payoff). The rea-
son behind this peculiar character lies in the spatial re-
strictions imposed by the underlying topology, meaning
that the individual payoff does not only depend on the
character but also on the local environment the player is
competing in. This is proved by the tendency of the play-
ers to cluster or aggregate of players into configurations
where the payoffs are favored and the dependence of the
relative equilibrium densities in r reflects the change in
preferred configurations as this parameter is tuned.
When restricted to its original 2 components (C and D),
the memory-based snowdrift model has a peculiar be-
haviour. Formation of spatial patterns are observed on
lattices, together with the step structure of the density of
cooperation versus the payoff r parameter. The memory
length of individuals plays different roles at each cooper-
ation level. On heterogeneous (e.g. scale-free) networks,
nodes with highest degree are taken over by defectors
and this leads to an increased cooperation level. Further-
more, similarly to the cases on lattices, the average de-
grees of SF networks is still a significant structural prop-
erty for determining cooperative behavior. The memory
effect on cooperation investigated in our work may draw
some attention from scientific communities in the study
of evolutionary games.
The backbone of the model and its dynamics. – In
this section, we explicitly consider the presence of the
third S character in the community, with two important
modifications with respect to [5]. The first one involves
global feedback mechanics for the payoff of S-players,
which now depends on the total S-density in the commu-
nity. The second modification is that the time-evolution
is memory-based, following the proposal of [9].
Hereafter, we comment in more details our generaliza-
tion and the numerical findings of our investigation. To
make the present discussion self-contained, we also re-
discuss here some details already reported in the main
text. In our model, the adoption of the solitary strategy
has an additional payoff ξ q decreasing when the num-
ber of S-players increases (see the discussion below). The
rules are the following: once players have been placed on
the nodes of the network, at every time step all pairs of
connected players play the game simultaneously. The to-
tal payoff of each player is computed by summing over
the 2-player games played with its neighbours. At the
end of a round, each player chooses its best strategy by
considering the would-be payoff, at fixed strategy choice
of the other players. Finally, this optimal strategy is
stored in the last bit of player’s memory. Taking into ac-
count the bounded rationality of players, we assume that
players are limited in their analyzing power by allowing
them to retain at most the last M bits of past strategies
information. In the next iteration, the probability of mak-
ing a decision (i.e. choosing C, D or S) for each player
depends on the ratio of the numbers of C, D and S bits
stored in its memory. Finally, all players update their
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memories simultaneously and the above process the sys-
tem evolves by repeating the above procedure. Schemat-
ically, the description of the model is the following:
• Individuals are organized in the network defining
the neighborhood of each player.
• Each individual can choose among three strategies:
C (collaborative), D (defective) or S (solitary). We de-
note by fi the fraction of the i-type players in the net-
work. The payoff matrix for any pair-game is given
by
P =
C D S( )C 1 1− r q
D 1+ r 0 q
S (1+ ξ)q (1+ ξ)q (1+ ξ)q
. (6)
The parameter ξ is related to the fraction of S-players
in the community at a given time, i.e. ξ = 1 − fS.
Both r and q are in the interval [0, 1].
• Each individual is endowed of a fixed-length mem-
ory of possible C, D or S strategies. The initial mem-
ory is random for all the players.
• At any step, each individual plays with all its neigh-
bors, the total gain being the sum of the pair-games.
• The evolution of the system is memory-based. The
players adopt a selfish attitude to update their strate-
gies. At any iteration, a player chooses its behavior
selecting randomly one of the possible entries in its
memory. Then, it compares its total payoff with the
possible gains coming from selecting the other two
strategies. The strategy resulting in the highest gain
is added to the player’s memory, and the oldest entry
is deleted since the length is fixed. If two (or three)
strategies give the same (best) score, the update is
selected randomly among the best choices.
• The evolution then restarts with the next turn.
All simulations have been performed on regular lat-
tices or random graphs with 104 individuals. We report
on numerical results where we kept the players’ memory
length M = 45. For the first and second phases, the typ-
ical relaxation time of the system is of order of T = 1000
iterations of the Monte Carlo simulations and the final
fractions are always computed averaging from T = 1500
to T = 2000.
Deepening the second phase dynamics. – While the
S-players gain a significant fraction of the total popula-
tion as r or q grow (see figures 2 and 3 in the main text),
5The variation of the memory length affects the relaxation time of
the system (see the last section), but has otherwise marginal effects on
the strategic choices of the players in the steady state.
Fig. 8: Collection of snapshots of final states of the game ar-
ranged in the (r, q) plane. Collaborative players are denoted in
green, defectors in red and loners in grey. Each snapshot illus-
trates a 100× 100 lattice.
their presence has a relative effect on the local interaction
among the C and D players. In figure 8 we show a col-
lection of typical snapshots of final states arranged in the
(r, q) plane. We notice the cluster arrangement of the lon-
ers and that the regular patterns of C and D are preserved
and persist also in the second phase (even when these
solitary players are by far the dominant fraction). The
second phase comprises a number of subregions delim-
ited by discontinuous jumps of the fractions, depending
on the details of the local interactions among the charac-
ters. Another important similarity with the regular lattice
is that S-players still exhibit a strong tendency to group
together. An easy way to visualize this behavior is to
look at the final configurations of the system (in the sec-
ond phase), and remove from the graph all the C- and
D-nodes (together with their links). Samples of the resid-
ual graphs are shown in figure 9, for q = 0.3 and two
choices of r in the Watts-Strogatz setting. After the re-
moval of the C- and D-players, the S-individuals never
appear isolated, forming again clustered communities.
In this respect, the small-world property of the network
clearly favors the merging process of the solitary islands,
since the size of the biggest connected component of S-
players grows much more quickly than in the regular lat-
tice. Behavioral similarities between mean evolution of
order parameters within small worlds and regular lat-
tices have been already highlighted also in the theoretical
framework of classical statistical mechanics of spin sys-
tems [6–8].
Deepening the character of phase transitions, we tenta-
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Fig. 9: Two sample of final configurations in Watts-Strogatz
setting (with size N = 1000 and rewiring probability θ = 0.1)
with C- and D-nodes (and the relative links) removed. The tun-
able parameters are q = 0.3 and r = 0.48, 0.54. These snapshots
clearly show the strong tendency of the loners to clusterize in
solitary islands (which eventually merge) in the second phase
of the system dynamics.
tively termed them (respectively) first and second order
since they appear in a quite standard way. Indeed, they
show a strong resemblance of first and second order tran-
sitions in the Ehrenfest classification in equilibrium sta-
tistical mechanics. However, we stress that here there is
no underlying detailed balance in players’ dynamics, thus
there is no guarantee regarding a convergence to a Gibbs
measure for the persistence of the classical picture: this
motivates our mild identification of these transitions.
Fig. 10: In the first column, we show the time evolution of
the fractions of loners coop and defectors for fixed q = 0.3 and
increasing r towards the unstable region (r = 0.73, 0.74, 0.8). In
the second column, we show three snapshots of configuration of
the system. For r = 0.73, the system reaches an almost spatially
stable configuration, with some residual oscillatory behavior of
the players along the borders of the C/D regions. While the
C/D player are confined in islands and the configuration is
dominated by the solitary individuals, their typical spatial in-
teraction pattern is still clearly recognizable. The time evolution
of the fractions suggest that the oscillations are slowly decreas-
ing in time, leading to a final stable configuration for very long
times. Increasing the payoff to r = 0.74, the oscillatory behavior
becomes endemic. While it is still possible to clearly recognize
patterns of C- and D-players in the configuration, the stability
of their spatial interaction is lost. Finally, for even higher val-
ues of r (and higher density of S-players), any hint of spatial
arrangement is lost, and all the players behave erratically. Nev-
ertheless, the fraction (widely) oscillates around a stable mean
value for relatively long time averages.
Deepening the third phase dynamics. – While in the
main text we have shown the intrinsic instability of the
third phase (explaining its genesis and its relation to the
global awareness feedback introduced by our extended
payoff matrix in the limit of large r), here we aim to
deepen the fact that - albeit the system is no longer sta-
ble - its three order parameters set on mean stable val-
ues if suitably averaged in time (see the high r limit of
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all the plots in the figures 2, 5, 6 in the main text).6 At
the basis of this successful processing of temporal aver-
aging, there is the observation that (apart for stochastic
effects), the network’s dynamics at the onset of the third
phase is rather periodic: there are waves of colonization
by S-players that, once they reach their maximal ampli-
tude, disintegrate and recursively give rise to novel gen-
erations. This process is governed by a typical frequency
which can be clearly visualized in figures 10 and 11. This
Fig. 11: Fractions of solitary players versus time for two differ-
ent memory lengths (M = 5 and M = 10) in a simplified model
with only C- and S-players for q = 0.87. A trivial eye inspec-
tion reveals that the peak of maximal density are periodic, with
typical frequency M + 1.
typical frequency depends on the memory-length, since
the distance between two peaks is given exactly by M+ 1
Monte Carlo steps. The explanation of its genesis is triv-
ial: let us focus on M = 4 with no loss of generality.
After an initial transient, for q large enough the system
evolves toward a final state made of by all S-players.
Once this configuration is reached, all the players update
their memory at random (i.e., using the label R to mean
randomly, {S, S, S, R}). In successive steps, it is manda-
tory for all the players to keep choosing the S-strategy, so
that their memory dynamics is trivially
{S, S, S, R} → {S, S, R, S} →
→ {S, R, S, S} → {R, S, S, S} → {S, S, S, S},
up to the catastrophe again and so on: these dynamical
regularities allow the effective thermalization to constant
values for the fractions of players also in the third phase
of the system.
The two-component limit: solitary vs cooperative
players. – By keeping r fixed and moving q, we can
check the evolution of the three fractions of C-, D-, and
S-players. The S-density grows smoothly and its growth
is largely determined by the domain-walls lying on the
6We further stress that also in [5] the Authors average on suitably
time-window the evolution of these fraction and they obtain analogous
apparently stabilized averages.
boundaries of their clusters (and by the advantages a C-
or D-player has in turning into an S-player on that bor-
der).
To deepen this feature, we restricted the game to a two-
players model, with solely C- and S-players and with a
payoff matrix given by
PSG =
C S( )
C 1 q
S (1+ ξ)q (1+ ξ)q
. (7)
In a nutshell, this setup trivializes the interactions among
C- and D-individuals effectively resulting in a simplified
model for the dynamics of the S-players, whose density
can finally be plotted versus q as shown in figure 12. The
critical line is indeed achieved by exploiting the stability
criterion
8(1+ (1− fS))q > 4+ 4q, (8)
for a C-player lying on the boundaries of an S-cluster.
The red curve in figure 12 can be obtained by studying
the behavior of a single player in a 3× 3 triangle placed
at the boundary of a solitary cluster and checking the
threshold for its shift S→ C. In fact, if the player keeps
the S-strategy, its total payoff would be
SL = 8 (1+ (1− fS)) q (9)
while, if it adopts for the C-strategy, it would be
SC = 4+ 4q, (10)
since it would have four C-peers and four L-peers. Solv-
ing the equality SC = SL w.r.t. the solitaries fraction
we obtain the critical S-density fS(q) = (−1 + 3q)/(2q),
which is the equation for the red curve in figure 12.
The orange curve can be similarly obtained with evaluat-
ing the threshold for a transition C→ S near the bound-
ary of an S-cluster. With the same reasoning as before, we
get the following criterion:
8(1+ (1− fS))q = 5+ 3q, (11)
and solving again w.r.t fS, we get the equation
fS(q) =
−5+ 13q
8q
. (12)
Finally, in this simplified model we also studied the
character of the phase transitions in q, finding that they
can be identified as second order in the standard Ehren-
fest classification, see figures 13 and 14.
Memory relaxation of single player games. – In or-
der to analyze the dependence on M of the relaxation
time of the memory-based game, let us discuss the sim-
ple case of a single player self-game. The state s of the
player is a vector with M bits taking 0 or 1 values. At
each step, we extract a move µ ∈ {0, 1} with probability
nµ(s) proportional to the number of µ values in s. Then,
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Fig. 12: By analyzing the mean growth of fS we conclude that,
at fixed r and evolving q, the solitary players conquer the sys-
tem qualitatively always in the same manner, poorly dependent
by the other player’s activities. The plot shows the comparison
between numerical data for the simplified model with only col-
laborative and solitary players and the relative theoretical pre-
dictions coming from the stability criterions.
Fig. 13: In these four panels we show, for four different network
sizes, how the evolution of the mean of the order parameter fS
is coupled with the growth of its standard deviation: as it shines
trough all the plots, the raise from zero of fS is smooth and it is
always accompanied by a peak in its variance, (i.e. the normal-
ized solitary susceptibility). We note further that - at the onset
of the unstable phase - again the fluctuations of fS peak (more
mildly than in the first transition, yet, somehow they give a crit-
ical flavour also to that transition). Note that, among these two
main peaks, a plethora of small fluctuations further characterize
several local critical rearrangements.
the memory is updated s → s′, where s′ is obtained from
s by first shifting and then adding the new value µ, where
0 = 1 and 1 = 0. This is a finite Markov chain with di-
mension d = 2M. By analizing the transfer matrix Ts′ ,s,
it can be shown that it has only one stable eigenvector
with eigenvalue λ0 = 1. This is a stationary non-trivial
probability distribution Ps given by
Ps =
√
pi
4M
Γ(M + 1)
Γ(M + 12 )
(
M
n1(s)
)
. (13)
Fig. 14: The plot shows the dependence of the solitary suscepti-
bility (i.e. the variance of the S-density suitably amplified with a
volume factor) as a function of the network size N at the critical
values qC,i in the simplified model with only collaborative and
solitary players. Here, qC,1 is the critical value for the transi-
tion between the first and second phase of the dynamics, while
qC,2 is the critical value for the transition in the unstable third
phase. By looking at its scaling behavior at these critical values,
it is reasonable to expect that the solitary susceptibility diverges
in the infinite size limit, meaning that the transitions in q can be
classified as second order phase transition.
The characteristic polynomial of T factorizes and the
eigenvalue λ1 with largest modulus ( strictly smaller than
1) is the largest modulus solution of the polynomial equa-
tion
M λM1 +
λM1 − 1
λ1 − 1 = 0. (14)
At large M, this gives
|λ1| = 1− αM + · · · , (15)
where α = 1.58255 . . . is obtained from α = log(−β csc β)
with β being the root of
− 1+ log(−β csc β) + β cot β = 0, (16)
in [pi, 2pi]. This means that the game relaxed to the equi-
librium distribution with a characteristic number of itera-
tions Nrelax = −1/ log |λ1| = M/α+ · · · . A model closer
to our situation is characterized by the storage of µ (in-
stead of µ). In this case there are two stable eigenvectors
associated with the stable configurations with all 0’s or all
1’s. The subleading eigenvalue λ1 cannot be computed
in closed form parametrically in M, as in (14), but can be
numerically solved at finite M with results similar to (15)
(although with a different coefficient α).
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